Wednesday, October 26, 2011

Court reviews whether an attorney-in-fact has the power to name herself as beneficiary of an insurance policy

EVA WEAVER v. PRISCILLA DEVERELL, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 26, 2011)

This is a case involving life insurance and a Power of Attorney. After Decedent named Appellant as his attorney-in-fact through a Power of Attorney, the Appellant changed Decedent's life insurance policy to name herself as primary beneficiary. Appellee, the previous beneficiary of the policy, filed this action to prevent Appellant from receiving the proceeds, alleging fraud. The trial court found that the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act prevented Appellant from changing the beneficiary of the policy. Further, the trial court held that Appellant's argument that she had actual authority to make the change was an affirmative defense that was waived by Appellant's failure to specifically plead it. Based on the foregoing, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/weavere_102611.pdf

Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Court reviews whether wife's second will was void based on a previous contract to execute mutual wills with her husband

IN RE: ESTATE OF INA RUTH BROWN (Tenn. Ct. App. October 4, 2011)

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract to execute mutual wills. Ina Ruth Brown ("Mrs. Brown"), and her husband, Roy Brown, Jr. ("Mr. Brown"), executed mutual wills as agreed by contract.

After Mr. Brown's death, Mrs. Brown executed a new will. Mrs. Brown died. Rockford Evan Estes ("Defendant"), Mrs. Brown's son, submitted the new will for probate.

Mr. Brown's adult children, Roy E. Brown, III, Joan Brown Moyers, and Donna Brown Ellis ("the Plaintiffs") filed this will contest suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County, Probate Division ("the Trial Court"), contesting the new will on the basis that, among other things, the mutual wills between Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown were irrevocable.

Both the Plaintiffs and Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court denied Defendant's motion, granted the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and voided the new will created by Mrs. Brown. Defendant appeals.

We hold that the Trial Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment because the Trial Court did have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this will contest based on this breach of contract claim. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in granting the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment after also finding that the June 13, 2002 contract to execute mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/browni_100411.pdf