IN RE ESTATE OF VIOLA B. COPAS consolidated with NORMAN COPAS, ET AL. V. RANDALL COPAS (Tenn. Ct. App. January 20, 2012)
This appeal concerns whether the son of a decedent breached his fiduciary duty under a power of attorney and as the personal representative of the decedent's estate. The siblings sued their brother, asserting that he used undue influence over their mother in order to unlawfully obtain her funds for his benefit to the exclusion of his mother and her estate. The brother argued that the money was properly used to take care of his mother and to run her farm. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the siblings for $2,040,276, plus attorney fees totaling $102,576.36, upon finding that the brother failed to meet his burden to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of undue influence. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/copasv_012012.pdf
Monday, January 30, 2012
Friday, January 13, 2012
Court reviews a motion to set aside a jury verdict in a will contest case
IN RE: THE ESTATE OF BESSIE LOUISE THORNTON (Tenn. Ct. App. January 13, 2012)
In this will contest, the jury found that a confidential relationship existed between the principal beneficiary of the will and the testatrix; however, the jury also found that the will was not the result of undue influence and, therefore, the will was valid.
The contestant filed post-trial motions pursuant to Rules 50.02 and 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict, and alternatively, for a new trial. The trial court set aside the judgment of the jury, and entered judgment declaring the will invalid on the grounds that it was the result of undue influence. The trial court did not expressly rule on the alternative motion for a new trial.
The proponent of the will appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's verdict and entering judgment in favor of the contestant. We agree that the trial court erred by entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; however, we have also concluded that the trial court, acting in its role as thirteenth juror, implicitly and conditionally granted the contestant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/thorntonb_011312.pdf
In this will contest, the jury found that a confidential relationship existed between the principal beneficiary of the will and the testatrix; however, the jury also found that the will was not the result of undue influence and, therefore, the will was valid.
The contestant filed post-trial motions pursuant to Rules 50.02 and 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict, and alternatively, for a new trial. The trial court set aside the judgment of the jury, and entered judgment declaring the will invalid on the grounds that it was the result of undue influence. The trial court did not expressly rule on the alternative motion for a new trial.
The proponent of the will appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's verdict and entering judgment in favor of the contestant. We agree that the trial court erred by entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; however, we have also concluded that the trial court, acting in its role as thirteenth juror, implicitly and conditionally granted the contestant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/thorntonb_011312.pdf
Saturday, January 7, 2012
Court reviews a claim to recover the value of improvements made to real estate filed against the decedents' estates
IN RE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN M. BATES AND ESTATE OF PEARL BATES (Tenn. Ct. App. January 6, 2012)
This appeal arises from a claim filed against two decedents' estates to recover the value of improvements made to real estate since 2000. The claimant is one of nine children of the decedents, husband and wife, who died in 1959 and 1962, respectively. The court granted the appellee's claim for the value of improvements made since 2000 to the decedents' former home place. Because the decedents died intestate, their real property immediately vested in their heirs in 1962. Therefore, the real estate the claimant improved beginning in 2000 was not owned by either decedent at that time or thereafter; thus, the award of a claim against the estates of these two decedents is a nullity. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/batesb_010612.pdf
This appeal arises from a claim filed against two decedents' estates to recover the value of improvements made to real estate since 2000. The claimant is one of nine children of the decedents, husband and wife, who died in 1959 and 1962, respectively. The court granted the appellee's claim for the value of improvements made since 2000 to the decedents' former home place. Because the decedents died intestate, their real property immediately vested in their heirs in 1962. Therefore, the real estate the claimant improved beginning in 2000 was not owned by either decedent at that time or thereafter; thus, the award of a claim against the estates of these two decedents is a nullity. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/batesb_010612.pdf
Tuesday, January 3, 2012
Court reviews whether a will was executed in compliance with Tennessee law
IN RE ESTATE OF THOMAS GRADY CHASTAIN (Tenn. Ct. App. December 28, 2011)
We granted the application of June Chastain Patterson ("the Proponent"), which sought permission to appeal an order of the trial court holding, as a matter of law, that the "will" of Thomas Grady Chastain ("the Deceased") was not executed in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 32-1-104 (2007). The Deceased signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses on September 4, 2004, which affidavit was attached to the purported will of the same date; he also initialed the bottom of the first page of the "will," but did not sign the second page of the two-page "will." The Proponent appeals. We reverse.
Full majority opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/chastaint_122811.pdf
SWINEY's dissenting opinion:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/chastaint_DIS_122811.pdf
We granted the application of June Chastain Patterson ("the Proponent"), which sought permission to appeal an order of the trial court holding, as a matter of law, that the "will" of Thomas Grady Chastain ("the Deceased") was not executed in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 32-1-104 (2007). The Deceased signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses on September 4, 2004, which affidavit was attached to the purported will of the same date; he also initialed the bottom of the first page of the "will," but did not sign the second page of the two-page "will." The Proponent appeals. We reverse.
Full majority opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/chastaint_122811.pdf
SWINEY's dissenting opinion:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/chastaint_DIS_122811.pdf
Court reviews against whom the costs of a temporary conservatorship should be assessed
IN RE: CONSERVATORSHIP OF JOHN DANIEL TATE (Tenn. Ct. App. January 3, 2012)
This is the second appeal arising from a disputed "temporary" conservatorship. Three issues are presented: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of the protection and supervision of the court; which party is responsible for the costs of the proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-114(a); and which party is responsible for discretionary costs under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2).
The petitioner was appointed "Temporary Conservator" and served in this fiduciary capacity for thirty-one months until June of 2010, at which time the trial court terminated the conservatorship upon the finding that the respondent was no longer a "disabled person" as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-101(7). Over the objection of the ward, the trial court assessed the costs of the conservatorship against the respondent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-114(a) because a "fiduciary" was appointed, and discretionary costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2) upon the finding that the petitioner was the "prevailing party."
The respondent contends this was error because the conservator was merely appointed the "temporary conservator" and the petition to create the conservatorship was ultimately dismissed. We find the evidence presented to the trial court on November 14, 2007, clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservator of his person and property; we find no error with the trial court's conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-114(a) because a conservator was appointed; and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs against the respondent under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). Thus, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/tatej_010312.pdf
This is the second appeal arising from a disputed "temporary" conservatorship. Three issues are presented: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of the protection and supervision of the court; which party is responsible for the costs of the proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-114(a); and which party is responsible for discretionary costs under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2).
The petitioner was appointed "Temporary Conservator" and served in this fiduciary capacity for thirty-one months until June of 2010, at which time the trial court terminated the conservatorship upon the finding that the respondent was no longer a "disabled person" as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-101(7). Over the objection of the ward, the trial court assessed the costs of the conservatorship against the respondent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-114(a) because a "fiduciary" was appointed, and discretionary costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2) upon the finding that the petitioner was the "prevailing party."
The respondent contends this was error because the conservator was merely appointed the "temporary conservator" and the petition to create the conservatorship was ultimately dismissed. We find the evidence presented to the trial court on November 14, 2007, clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservator of his person and property; we find no error with the trial court's conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-114(a) because a conservator was appointed; and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs against the respondent under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). Thus, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/tatej_010312.pdf
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)