tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-58097618168191415662024-02-07T14:44:49.333-08:00Tennessee Estate Planning LawThe Tennessee Real Estate Law Blog is published by the Adams Law Firm, a full-service law firm with offices in Knoxville and Nashville, Tennessee.David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comBlogger63125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-70251251266261785642012-06-27T11:41:00.000-07:002012-07-13T11:41:12.682-07:00Court reviews a grant of real property that was divided in a codicil to the decedent's will<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/hillj_061912.pdf">IN RE: ESTATE OF JACK B. HILL, JANE ANN STEFFEY, EXECUTRIX (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2012)</a><br />
<br />
This appeal involves a dispute over the decedent's Codicil to his Will. The Codicil divided decedent's real property between decedent's daughter and Jeff W. Powell. When decedent was on his death bed he asked a lawyer to prepare the Codicil, which described where certain property lines between the parties would be drawn, and the Codicil essentially gave 45 acres to decedent's daughter and 55 acres to Powell. During the administration of the Estate, the parties employed a surveyor to survey the property lines for the purpose of preparing the respective deeds. The surveyor determined that the description of the boundaries in the Codicil gave Powell 80 plus acres and the decedent's daughter 19 plus acres. <br />
<br />
Essentially, the Trial Court held that the descriptions created patent ambiguities, but he also concluded that even if the ambiguities were latent, extensive governance would be required to validate the Codicil, which is not appropriate. Accordingly, he voided the Codicil altogether. Powell has appealed. <br />
<br />
We reverse the Trial Court and hold that the decedent's intent was to give his daughter 45 acres and Powell 55 acres, and we reinstate the Codicil with directions to the Trial Court to direct the surveyor to reconfigure the boundaries to carry out the intent of the testator.<br />
<br />
Opinion available at:<br />
<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/hillj_061912.pdf">https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/hillj_061912.pdf</a><br />
David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-68237742685964259562012-06-20T11:36:00.000-07:002012-07-13T11:37:50.407-07:00Court reviews a dispute involving a partial conservatorship<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/lawtonl_061812.pdf">IN THE MATTER OF LYLE L. LAWTON (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2012)</a><br />
<br />
This appeal involves a conservatorship. After the parties announced in open court that they had reached an agreement on a partial conservatorship, the appellant ward stood up in court and asked to speak. The hearing was adjourned and subsequently the partial conservatorship was ordered in accordance with the agreement. The ward now appeals, arguing inter alia that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, failing to make the requisite findings, and failing to hear from the ward. We find no error and affirm.<br />
<br />
Opinion available at:<br />
<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/lawtonl_061812.pdf">https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/lawtonl_061812.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-19123253475420535602012-06-18T14:41:00.000-07:002012-06-24T14:41:30.287-07:00Court reviews whether a decedent's niece had standing to pursue the administration of the decedent's estate<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/glasscocke_061312.pdf">IN RE THE DECEDANT ESTATE OF EDWARD LAVOY GLASSCOCK (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2012)</a><br />
<br />
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition filed by the niece of a decedent’s surviving spouse to have the decedent’s estate administered and to have a personal representative appointed. The probate court dismissed the niece’s petition for lack of standing holding that she could not proceed as next friend of her aunt because her aunt had previously appointed the decedent’s brother as her attorney-in-fact. The niece contends on appeal that she has standing to pursue the administration of the decedent’s estate in accordance Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 17.03 because the attorney-in-fact for her aunt failed to initiate administration of the decedent’s estate. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.<br />
<br />
Opinion available at:<br />
<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/glasscocke_061312.pdf">https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/glasscocke_061312.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-34188700494044159112012-06-11T14:38:00.000-07:002012-06-24T14:39:03.579-07:00Court reviews the validity of a set of trust documents<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/cartwrightb_060512.pdf">BETTY C. GOFF CARTWRIGHT v. JACKSON CAPITAL, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 2012)</a><br />
<br />
This appeal involves various claims by a beneficiary of several trusts against his sister and her husband, who serve as the trustee and co-trustee of some of the trusts. The defendants/trustees filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that they had followed the terms of the trusts and paid the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled pursuant to the trust documents. In response, the beneficiary asserted that the trust documents were void either because they were fabricated, or because he executed them due to undue influence. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, and the beneficiary voluntarily dismissed all of his remaining claims. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.<br />
<br />
Opinion available at:<br />
<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/cartwrightb_060512.pdf">https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/cartwrightb_060512.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-62887998865908538112012-06-03T09:29:00.001-07:002012-06-03T09:29:28.322-07:00Opinion: Why You Must Have a WillA Washington Post columnist explains what happened when her brother and grandmother died without having wills. Michelle Singletary knows excuses -- to expensvie, too much paperwork -- and points out why those things are not true. <br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/may/06/michelle-singletary-the-necessity-of-having-a/">Read the full story at the Knoxville News Sentinel's website.</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-48000729229548709202012-04-27T09:41:00.001-07:002012-04-27T09:43:25.951-07:00Conservatorships Under ScrutinyConcern over possible abuses in the conservatorship process is prompting some elderly advocates to call for reforms and model laws across the country that grant more rights to the individual and offer more protection. The Tennessean reports on <a href="http://www.tennessean.com/article/20120415/NEWS01/304150037">one recent case where an 82-year-old Nashville woman lost all of her possessions in a conservatorship case.</a> <br />
<br />
State Rep. Gary Odom, D-Nashville, has <a href="http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=HB2648">filed a bill</a> that would provide additional protection to people facing conservatorship, the newspaper reports. “We’ve got to make sure that people aren’t put into conservatorship without due process,” Odom says. His bill would set new notice requirements before a conservatorship could be imposed. It also would require additional medical proof, including sworn statements from three physicians, that an emergency conservatorship was justified.David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-52972362626388952312012-04-20T09:45:00.000-07:002012-04-27T09:46:30.829-07:00Court reviews whether the Executor or the Survivor is entitled to the Deceased's bank accounts and CDs<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/guessg_041612.pdf">G. PERRY GUESS, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF C. CHARLTON HOWARD v. ELIZABETH G. FINLAY (Tenn. Ct. App. April 16, 2012)</a><br />
<br />
This case involves a dispute between G. Perry Guess (“the Executor”), 1 Executor of the Estate of C. Charlton Howard (“the Deceased”), and the Executor’s sister, Elizabeth G. Finlay (“the Survivor”), regarding the ownership of funds, following the death of the Deceased, in several bank accounts and certificates of deposit. <br />
<br />
The trial court awarded the bank accounts to the Executor and the CDs to the Survivor. The Executor claims he is also entitled to the CDs while the Survivor argues that she should have received all of the funds. <br />
<br />
We reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding the bank accounts to the Executor. We modify the judgment in favor of the Survivor so as to award to her all of the bank accounts as well as the CDs.<br />
<br />
Opinion available at:<br />
<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/guessg_041612.pdf">https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/guessg_041612.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-60711033787163746332012-04-20T07:30:00.000-07:002012-04-27T09:49:11.875-07:00Court reviews whether a petition to turn over assets was barred by res judicata<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/gozaj_041112.pdf">IN THE MATTER OF: ESTATE OF JOHN J. GOZA (Tenn. Ct. App. April 11, 2012)</a><br />
<br />
The trial court determined that Petitioner’s petition to turn over assets was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.<br />
<br />
Opinion available at:<br />
<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/gozaj_041112.pdf">https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/gozaj_041112.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-32055334619034631872012-03-26T15:37:00.002-07:002012-03-26T15:38:00.880-07:00Subcommittee Approves Inheritance Tax BillIn a last-minute move today, Republican legislators took a big step toward fully repealing Tennessee's inheritance tax when the House Finance Subcommittee voted by unanimous voice vote to increase the exemption on the tax from $1 million to $1.25 million. But rather than increase the exemption over one year, as originally proposed, legislators opted for a multi-year approach, phasing in the full increase through 2016. <br /><br /><a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/news/2012/03/21/death-tax-haslam-republicans-tennessee.html?ana=e_du_pub&s=article_du&ed=2012-03-21">Read the full story at The Nashville Business Journal.</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-90692139663295750872012-03-17T15:44:00.000-07:002012-03-26T15:46:35.014-07:00Court determines to whom a tax refund should have been awarded<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/huntn_031612.pdf">THE ESTATE OF NOEL C. HUNT, III, H. WAYNE GRANT, EXECUTOR v. TRISHA L. JOLLEY HUNT (Tenn. Ct. App. March 16, 2012)</a><br /><br /><br />Appellant Estate sought declaratory judgment against Appellee widow for return of proceeds from the widow and Decedent’s jointly filed federal and state tax returns. The Estate contends that, under an Antenuptial Agreement entered by and between Decedent and Appellee, the income tax refunds were Decedent’s separate property, which thus belong to the Estate. Appellee widow contends that the filing of a joint tax return transmuted the separate property into marital property and, in the alternative, that a tenancy by the entirety was created in the tax refunds. <br /><br />The trial court found that, although the tax refunds were Decedent’s separate property under the Antenuptial Agreement, part of those proceeds should, nonetheless, pass to the wife. We conclude that the filing of a joint tax return does not create a property right, and that a tenancy by the entirety was not established. Consequently, as Decedent’s separate property, the tax refunds should have been awarded to the Estate. Reversed and remanded.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/huntn_031612.pdf">https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/huntn_031612.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-4610282427562426832012-03-12T15:46:00.000-07:002012-03-26T15:48:46.247-07:00Court reviews whether the executors' brother filed a meritless claim against his mother's estate.<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/moungere_031212.pdf">E. JAY MOUNGER ET AL. v. CHARLES D. MOUNGER, JR. ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. March 12, 2012)</a><br /><br />The plaintiffs, in their capacity as executors of their mother’s estate, filed this action against their brother alleging that he caused the estate to lose the sale of a valuable piece of lakefront property by maliciously asserting a meritless claim to a portion of the property. The defendant represented himself in a jury trial. The jury awarded the estate $6,000,000. The defendant appeals the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict. We affirm.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/moungere_031212.pdf">https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/moungere_031212.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-50543277887046088042012-02-23T12:00:00.002-08:002012-02-28T17:09:14.740-08:00Court reviews whether a confidential relationship existed between the decedent and caretakers who influenced him to change his will<a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/nortonh_022312.pdf">IN RE ESTATE OF HOMER P. NORTON (Tenn. Ct. App. February 23, 2012)</a><br /><br />This lawsuit was filed by the decedent’s nephew and the nephew’s wife alleging that the caretakers of the decedent improperly influenced him to change his will. The proponents of the decedent’s will filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that no confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the caretakers in regard to the will. The trial court granted the proponents’ motion, finding that proof of a confidential relationship was necessary to pursue a will contest on the ground of undue influence, and that no such confidential relationship existed between decedent and the caretakers. The contestants appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/nortonh_022312.pdf">https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/nortonh_022312.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-10070303996310258292012-02-10T14:00:00.000-08:002012-02-28T16:40:50.912-08:00Court reviews whether a claimant is entitled to reimbursement for mortgage payments submitted on behalf of the decedent<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/miguelm_021012.pdf">IN RE ESTATE OF MARSHAL SAN MIGUEL (Tenn. Ct. App. February 10, 2012)</a><br /><br />Michael San Miguel ("Claimant") filed a claim against his brother's estate, Marshal San Miguel ("Decedent"), alleging that Decedent was responsible for expenses and mortgage payments relating to their jointly-owned Louisiana property. Decedent's son, Nicholas Brandon San Miguel ("Beneficiary"), filed an exception to the claim. The clerk and master disallowed the claim. Claimant objected to the clerk and master's report, and the trial court precluded recovery. Claimant appeals. We reverse the court's preclusion of recovery of the mortgage payments and expenses and conclude that Claimant is entitled to reimbursement for the mortgage payments submitted on behalf of Decedent and a portion of the expenses incurred on behalf of the property. We affirm the court's decision in all other respects.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/miguelm_021012.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/miguelm_021012.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-56875971173936016352012-02-10T12:00:00.001-08:002012-02-24T11:14:58.542-08:00Court reviews an appeal filed by the personal representative of an estate<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/demonbreunr_020912.pdf">IN RE ESTATE OF REGINALD BOYA DEMONBREUN (Tenn. Ct. App. February 9, 2012)</a><br /><br />The decedent and a partner purchased property which became the decedent's residence. In 2009, the partner quitclaimed his half of the property, worth $35,000, to the decedent. They executed a promissory note stating that the decedent would pay $600 per month until the balance was paid in full. <br /><br />When the decedent died, he still owed $27,900 to the partner. The partner filed a claim for the unpaid balance but could only provide a copy of the promissory note because he could not find the original. The probate court found that the photocopy was permissible and granted his claim for $27,500. <br /><br />The personal representative appealed the order on the grounds that the best evidence rule should have barred the photocopy. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had not committed any error and affirmed their ruling.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/demonbreunr_020912.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/demonbreunr_020912.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-51291457349080557592012-01-30T16:15:00.000-08:002012-01-30T16:17:44.314-08:00Court reviews whether a decedent's son breached his fiduciary duty and used undue influence to obtain money from the decedent while she was living<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/copasv_012012.pdf">IN RE ESTATE OF VIOLA B. COPAS consolidated with NORMAN COPAS, ET AL. V. RANDALL COPAS (Tenn. Ct. App. January 20, 2012)</a><br /><br />This appeal concerns whether the son of a decedent breached his fiduciary duty under a power of attorney and as the personal representative of the decedent's estate. The siblings sued their brother, asserting that he used undue influence over their mother in order to unlawfully obtain her funds for his benefit to the exclusion of his mother and her estate. The brother argued that the money was properly used to take care of his mother and to run her farm. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the siblings for $2,040,276, plus attorney fees totaling $102,576.36, upon finding that the brother failed to meet his burden to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of undue influence. We affirm.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/copasv_012012.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/copasv_012012.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-87338147306560672512012-01-13T18:00:00.000-08:002012-02-01T18:01:52.419-08:00Court reviews a motion to set aside a jury verdict in a will contest case<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/thorntonb_011312.pdf">IN RE: THE ESTATE OF BESSIE LOUISE THORNTON (Tenn. Ct. App. January 13, 2012)</a><br /><br />In this will contest, the jury found that a confidential relationship existed between the principal beneficiary of the will and the testatrix; however, the jury also found that the will was not the result of undue influence and, therefore, the will was valid. <br /><br />The contestant filed post-trial motions pursuant to Rules 50.02 and 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict, and alternatively, for a new trial. The trial court set aside the judgment of the jury, and entered judgment declaring the will invalid on the grounds that it was the result of undue influence. The trial court did not expressly rule on the alternative motion for a new trial. <br /><br />The proponent of the will appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's verdict and entering judgment in favor of the contestant. We agree that the trial court erred by entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; however, we have also concluded that the trial court, acting in its role as thirteenth juror, implicitly and conditionally granted the contestant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/thorntonb_011312.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/thorntonb_011312.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-50556000811456921182012-01-07T15:30:00.000-08:002012-02-01T18:03:48.777-08:00Court reviews a claim to recover the value of improvements made to real estate filed against the decedents' estates<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/batesb_010612.pdf">IN RE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN M. BATES AND ESTATE OF PEARL BATES (Tenn. Ct. App. January 6, 2012)</a><br /><br />This appeal arises from a claim filed against two decedents' estates to recover the value of improvements made to real estate since 2000. The claimant is one of nine children of the decedents, husband and wife, who died in 1959 and 1962, respectively. The court granted the appellee's claim for the value of improvements made since 2000 to the decedents' former home place. Because the decedents died intestate, their real property immediately vested in their heirs in 1962. Therefore, the real estate the claimant improved beginning in 2000 was not owned by either decedent at that time or thereafter; thus, the award of a claim against the estates of these two decedents is a nullity. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/batesb_010612.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/batesb_010612.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-3942192568844433432012-01-03T15:00:00.000-08:002012-01-03T17:16:28.179-08:00Court reviews whether a will was executed in compliance with Tennessee law<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/chastaint_122811.pdf">IN RE ESTATE OF THOMAS GRADY CHASTAIN (Tenn. Ct. App. December 28, 2011)</a><br /><br />We granted the application of June Chastain Patterson ("the Proponent"), which sought permission to appeal an order of the trial court holding, as a matter of law, that the "will" of Thomas Grady Chastain ("the Deceased") was not executed in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 32-1-104 (2007). The Deceased signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses on September 4, 2004, which affidavit was attached to the purported will of the same date; he also initialed the bottom of the first page of the "will," but did not sign the second page of the two-page "will." The Proponent appeals. We reverse.<br /><br />Full majority opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/chastaint_122811.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/chastaint_122811.pdf</a><br /><br />SWINEY's dissenting opinion:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/chastaint_DIS_122811.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/chastaint_DIS_122811.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-13607997668356578412012-01-03T12:00:00.000-08:002012-02-01T18:06:29.787-08:00Court reviews against whom the costs of a temporary conservatorship should be assessed<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/tatej_010312.pdf">IN RE: CONSERVATORSHIP OF JOHN DANIEL TATE (Tenn. Ct. App. January 3, 2012)</a><br /><br />This is the second appeal arising from a disputed "temporary" conservatorship. Three issues are presented: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of the protection and supervision of the court; which party is responsible for the costs of the proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-114(a); and which party is responsible for discretionary costs under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). <br /><br />The petitioner was appointed "Temporary Conservator" and served in this fiduciary capacity for thirty-one months until June of 2010, at which time the trial court terminated the conservatorship upon the finding that the respondent was no longer a "disabled person" as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-101(7). Over the objection of the ward, the trial court assessed the costs of the conservatorship against the respondent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-114(a) because a "fiduciary" was appointed, and discretionary costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2) upon the finding that the petitioner was the "prevailing party." <br /><br />The respondent contends this was error because the conservator was merely appointed the "temporary conservator" and the petition to create the conservatorship was ultimately dismissed. We find the evidence presented to the trial court on November 14, 2007, clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservator of his person and property; we find no error with the trial court's conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-1-114(a) because a conservator was appointed; and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs against the respondent under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). Thus, we affirm.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/tatej_010312.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/tatej_010312.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-39759595490146049512011-12-12T08:55:00.000-08:002011-12-27T08:59:45.059-08:00Court reviews whether decedent was competent to make a will or to enter into a marriage contract<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smallmanr_121211.pdf">IN RE: ESTATE OF RAYMOND L. SMALLMAN, DECEASED, MARK SMALLMAN, ET AL., V. LINDA CARAWAY, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. December 12, 2011)</a><br /><br />The two sons of decedent asked the Court to declare that their father died intestate and that his marriage to appellant a few days before he died was void because he was neither competent to make a will or enter into a marriage contract. Upon trial, the jury determined that the deceased was not of sound mind when he executed a will, a copy of which was filed in evidence, and the will was obtained through undue influence of appellant. The jury also found that the marriage between the decedent and appellant was invalid as well. The Trial Judge approved the jury verdict and appellant has appealed. We hold that material evidence supports the jury verdict as approved by the Trial Judge and remand. <br /><br />Full opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smallmanr_121211.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smallmanr_121211.pdf</a><br /><br />SUSANO's dissenting opinion is available here:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smallmanr_DIS_121211.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smallmanr_DIS_121211.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-79141178143017226002011-12-08T08:59:00.000-08:002011-12-27T09:02:14.913-08:00Court reviews whether the appellant successfully rebutted the presumption of undue influence<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/murdaughf_120811.pdf">IN RE: THE ESTATE OF FRANKLIN STEADMAN MURDAUGH, BARBARA MURDAUGH WARNER v. RUDY W. YOUNG (Tenn. Ct. App. December 8, 2011)</a><br /><br />This case arises from a will contest. Appellant, the executor and sole beneficiary of the contested will, appeals the trial court's finding that Appellant did not meet his burden to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of undue influence based upon the existence of a confidential relationship between Appellant and Decedent. Finding no error, we affirm. <br /><br />Full opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/murdaughf_120811.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/murdaughf_120811.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-83327728295346143342011-12-05T09:03:00.000-08:002011-12-27T09:05:06.204-08:00Court reviews whether the devisee can force enforcement of a contract between defendant and the decedent<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smitht_120511.pdf">TERESA SMITH, AS DEVISEE OF RONNIE CRABTREE v. LINDA D. HATFIELD (Tenn. Ct. App. December 5, 2011)</a><br /><br />This is a breach of contract case. The defendant seller entered into a contract to sell a mobile home to the plaintiff's decedent. The contract required the decedent to make monthly payments by a date certain for eighty-four months, and if he failed to do so, all of his payments would be forfeited as rent. The decedent failed to make all of his payments in a timely manner. Later, the decedent died. <br /><br />The plaintiff, the decedent's sole devisee, offered to pay the contract off by making a lump-sum payment to the defendant. The defendant rejected this offer. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, seeking to require the defendant to accept the lump-sum payment and convey the property to her. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims upon the close of her proof, because the undisputed evidence showed that she had not made the required monthly payments under the contract.The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm and award attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smitht_120511.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smitht_120511.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-3940933516968309532011-12-01T09:05:00.000-08:002011-12-27T09:07:37.542-08:00Creditors' Claims under the Tennessee Investment Services Act of 2007TN Attorney General Opinions<br />Date: 2011-11-28<br />Opinion Number: 11-79<br /><br /> <br /><b>QUESTION:</b><br /><br />Whether the Tennessee Investment Services Act of 2007 requires a creditor to prove fraud in order to prevail on an action for attachment or other provisional remedy against property that is a qualified disposition to an investment services trust, or to avoid a qualified disposition to such a trust?<br /><br /><b>OPINION:</b><br /><br />Yes. If the creditor’s claim arises before a qualified disposition, the creditor may prevail by proving actual or constructive fraud. However, if the creditor’s claim arises after a qualified disposition, the creditor must prove actual intent to defraud.<br /><br />Read the full opinion at: <a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/AG/2011/ag_11_79.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/AG/2011/ag_11_79.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-2064251239139543712011-11-15T09:25:00.000-08:002011-12-27T09:26:31.721-08:00Court reviews the validity of a holographic will that was executed while testator was under a conservatorship<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/rinehartm_111511.pdf">IN RE: ESTATE OF MIRIAM L. RINEHART (Tenn. Ct. App. November 15, 2011)</a><br /><br />This case concerns a holographic will executed by the testator while under a conservatorship. After the testator died, Appellant sought to be named personal representative over the decedent's estate and to have the decedent's holographic will probated. The decedent's daughter objected, arguing that at the time the holographic will was executed, the decedent was under a conservatorship that expressly revoked the decedent's right to make a will. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the decedent's daughter. Discerning no error, we affirm.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/rinehartm_111511.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/rinehartm_111511.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5809761816819141566.post-12467627093971001822011-11-02T09:08:00.000-07:002011-12-27T09:19:03.898-08:00Court reviews an action seeking to rescind a warranty deed<a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/alexanderm_110211.pdf">IN RE: THE MATTER OF THE CONSERVATORSHIP OF MITTIE T. ALEXANDER v. JB PARTNERS, A Tennessee General Partnership (Tenn. Ct. App. November 2, 2011)</a><br /><br />Plaintiff Conservator filed an action seeking rescission of a warranty deed executed by her Ward prior to the establishment of the conservatorship. The deed conveyed real property in Nashville to Defendant without consideration, but retained a life-estate. Plaintiff alleged incapacity to contract as grounds for rescission. Prior to the filing of Plaintiff's action, Defendant and Appellee Intervener executed a contract for sale of the property, subject to the life-estate. The trial court determined that the Intervener held superior title to the real property under the doctrine of equitable conversion. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Intervener pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.<br /><br />Opinion available at:<br /><a href="http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/alexanderm_110211.pdf">http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/alexanderm_110211.pdf</a>David Headrickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10982737271690243057noreply@blogger.com